The Political Economy of International Agreements

This volume analyzes international agreements from a political economy perspective. In four essays, it raises the question of whether domestic institutions help explain if countries join international agreements, and in case they do, what type of international organization they join. The book examines how specific democratic design elements channel and mediate domestic demands directed at politicians, and how under certain circumstances entering international agreements helps politicians navigate these demands to their benefit. The volume also distinguishes between different types of international instruments with a varying expected constraining effect upon member states, and empirically tests if this matters for incentives to join.

The volume addresses scholars, students, and practitioners interested in a better understanding of how the shape of domestic institutions affects politicians' incentives to enter into binding international agreements.

Autorentext

Florian Kiesow Cortez is a researcher and lecturer in political economy. His research focuses on comparative political economy, global governance, global public goods, the design of international organizations, and the empirical analysis of constitutions. He has published work empirically assessing determinants of international treaty ratification. He is also interested in the political economy of under-development.

He obtained his doctorate from the University of Hamburg, Germany, where he was a member of a graduate school organized by the Institute of Law and Economics and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). He was formerly a research fellow at George Mason University, Arlington, USA, and a visiting research fellow at Columbia University, New York, USA, and at the University of California, Berkeley, USA.

Inhalt
Chapter 1. Introduction.- Chapter 2. Domestic Institutions and the Political Economy of International Agreements: A Survey and Hypotheses.- Chapter 3. Domestic Institutions and the Ratification of International Agreements in a Panel of Democracies.- Chapter 4. Choosing to Be Constrained: Electoral Institutions and the Varieties of International Organizations.- Chapter 5. Enforcing International Deals: The System of International Organizations from a Politics-as-Exchange Perspective.