Leadership, Management and Command

The author argues that the successes and failures of D-Day, on both sides, cannot be explained by comparing the competing strategies of each side. Instead he provides an account of the battle through the overarching nature of the relationship between the leaders and their followers.

Autorentext
KEITH GRINT is Professor of Defence Leadership at Cranfield University, UK, and Deputy Principal (Leadership and Management) at the Defence College of Management and Leadership within the Defence Academy in Shrivenham. Previously he was Professor of Leadership Studies and Director of the Lancaster Leadership Centre at Lancaster University Management School. Before that he was Director of Research at the SaId Business School and Fellow in Organizational Behaviour, Templeton College, University of Oxford. Keith spent 10 years in industry before switching to an academic career. He is a founding co-editor of the journal Leadership, and founding co-organizer of the International Conference in Leadership Research. He remains a Visiting Research Professor at Lancaster, an Associate Fellow of the SaId Business School and Templeton College, Oxford, and a Fellow of the Sunningdale Institute, a research arm of the UK's National School of Government.

Inhalt
PART ONE: LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND COMMAND AT D-DAY: Problems, Understanding and Decision-Making PART TWO: LEADERSHIP & WICKED PROBLEMS Western Allied Strategy: the Boxer and the Karateka Allied Air Strategy Planning to Mislead German Strategy- Hard Shell, Soft Shell Allied Ground Strategy PART THREE: MANAGING TAME PROBLEMS Mobilizing the Anglo-Canadians, the Commonwealth, and the Volunteers. Mobilizing the Americans - Technology and the Iceberg Mobilizing the Germans: The Wehrmacht and the SS Managing Logistics - 'Bag, vomit, one.' Technologies PART FOUR: COMMANDING IN CRISES Commanding The Airborne Assaults Amphibious Landings PART FIVE: RETROSPECTIVE Post-D-Day