Elites, Institutions and the Quality of Government

To a large extent, elite politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen hold the fortunes of their societies in their hands. This edited volume describes how formal and informal institutions affect elite behaviour, which in turn affects corruption and the quality of government.

Autorentext
Mattias Agerberg, University of Gothenburg, SwedenAndreas Bågenholm, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and the Program Manager for the Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, SwedenNicholas Charron, Associate Professor, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden Agnes Cornell, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Government, Aarhus University, DenmarkStefan Dahlberg, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenCarl Dahlström, Professor at the Quality of Government Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenMichelle D'Arcy, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin, IrelandMarcia Grimes, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenSören Holmberg, Professor Emeritus in political science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenPhilip Keefer, Principal Advisor of the Institutions for Development Department of the Inter-American Development BankSpyros Kosmidis, Departmental Lecturer in Quantitative Methods, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, UKVictor Lapuente, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenUlrika Möller, Assistant Professor in Political Science, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenPetrus Olander, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenAnna Persson, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenLeonid Polishchuk, Economics Professor, Higher School of Economics, Moscow, RussiaSusan Rose-Ackerman, Henry R. Luce Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University, USABo Rothstein, August Röhss Chair in Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden Isabell Schierenbeck, Associate Professor in Political Science, School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, SwedenMartin Sjöstedt, Associate Professor in political science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenHelena Olofsdotter Stensöta, Associate Professor in political science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenAnders Sundell, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenGeorgiy Syunyaev, Columbia University, New York, USAAnn Towns, Associate Professor in political science, University of Gothenburg, SwedenLena Wängnerud, Professor in political science, Quality of Government Institute and the Multidisciplinary Opinion and Democracy Research Group at the University of Gothenburg, SwedenGeorgios Xezonakis, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg and a Research Fellow at the Quality of Government Institute

Inhalt
List of illustrations
Abbreviations
Preface
PART I: INTRODUCTION

1. How institutions constrain elites from destructive behavior; Carl Dahlström and Lena Wängnerud
2. Good Societies Need Good Leaders on a Leash; Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein
3. Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries?; Susan Rose-Ackerman
4. Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruption; Ann Towns
   PART II: HISTORY AND STATE-BUILDING
5. The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior; Anna Persson and Martin Sjöstedt
6. Political Leadership and Quality of Government: Restraining Elites at Nascent Statehood; Ulrika Möller and Isabell Schierenbeck
7. Rulers and their Elite Rivals: How Democratization has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa; Michelle D'Arcy
8. Stability and Stagnation; Anders Sundell
   PART III: POWER-SHARING
9. Democratic and Professional Accountability; Carl Dahlström and Victor Lapuente
10. Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership; Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev
11. Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behavior; Petrus Olander
12. Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Party Behavior; Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes
    PART IV: POLITICAL PARTIES
13. Political Parties and the Politics of The Quality Of Government; Philip Keefer
14. Why Women In Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Parties; Helena Stensöta, Lena Wängnerud and Mattias Agerberg
15. Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Government; Andreas Bågenholm and Nicholas Charron
16. Can Elections Combat Corruption? Accountability and Partisanship; Georgios Xezonakis, Spyros Kosmidis and Stefan Dahberg
    Index