Shipping and the American War 1775-83

Showing the complex interaction of strategy, logistics, administration, and economics, Syrett's pioneering text brings to light some basic causes for the ultimate failure of the British war effort during the American War of Independence. This war effort was fatally compromised by the British need to support a great army and a large naval force in the western hemisphere while at the same time facing a coalition of maritime powers on the European continent.

Autorentext

David Syrett was Distinguished Professor of History at Queen's College, City University of New York.

Inhalt

1 The Higher Chain of Command
2 The Navy Board
3 The Lower Chain of Command
4 Short-term Procurement of Tonnage
5 Long-term Procurement of Tonnage
6 The Measurement, Inspection and Fitting-out of Ships Entering the Transport Service
7 The Growth of the Provision Problem, 1775-79
8 The Navy Board's Victuallers
9 The Navy Board's Transports
10 Shipping and the American War: A Conclusion

Appendices
Bibliography
Index