Reforming the European Union

For decades the European Union tried changing its institutions, but achieved only unsatisfying political compromises and modest, incremental treaty revisions. In late 2009, however, the EU was successfully reformed through the Treaty of Lisbon. Reforming the European Union examines how political leaders ratified this treaty against all odds and shows how this victory involved all stages of treaty reform negotiations--from the initial proposal to referendums in several European countries.

The authors emphasize the strategic role of political leadership and domestic politics, and they use state-of-the-art methodology, applying a comprehensive data set for actors' reform preferences. They look at how political leaders reacted to apparent failures of the process by recreating or changing the rules of the game. While domestic actors played a significant role in the process, their influence over the outcome was limited as leaders ignored negative referendums and plowed ahead with intended reforms. The book's empirical analyses shed light on critical episodes: strategic agenda setting during the European Convention, the choice of ratification instrument, intergovernmental bargaining dynamics, and the reaction of the German Council presidency to the negative referendums in France, the Netherlands, and Ireland.

Autorentext
Daniel Finke is assistant professor of political science at the University of Heidelberg. Thomas König is professor of political science and director of the Research Centre for the Political Economy of Reforms at the University of Mannheim. Sven-Oliver Proksch is a research fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. George Tsebelis is the Anatol Rapoport Collegiate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan.

Inhalt

List of Figures xi

List of Tables xiii

Acknowledgments xv

Introduction 1

Chapter One: From the European Convention to the Lisbon Agreement and Beyond: A Veto Player Analysis
By George Tsebelis 28
1.1 Judges, Bureaucrats, and the Democratic Deficit 32
1.2 Veto Players and Their Policy and Institutional Implications 38
1.3 A Qualified Majority in the Council: To What Extent Does It Impede
Decision Making? 45
1.4 Battles over the "Default Solution" 54
1.5 Conclusion 60
Chapter Two: Revealing Constitutional Preferences in the European Convention
By Sven-OliverProksch 62
2.1 Revealing Preferences: Cosponsorship of Amendments in the European
Convention 64
2.2 Data and Method 68
2.3 Results: Giscard's Central Position within the Conflict Space 70
2.4 Conclusion 75
Chapter Three: The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention
By George Tsebelis and Sven-Oliver Proksch 76
3.1 Limiting the Number of Amendments 78
3.2 Shaping Amendments 88
3.3 The Absence of Voting 94
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion 95
Appendix 3A 97
Appendix 3B 99

Chapter Four: Actors and Positions on the Reform of the Treaty of Nice
By Thomas König and Daniel Finke 103
4.1 The Process of Reform: From the Convention to the Ratification Stage 107
4.2 The Two-dimensional Space and the Location of the Political Leaders' Positions 111
4.3 Other Actors and the Cohesiveness of the Political Leaders' Positions 116
4.4 Representing and Delegating the Position of Political Leaders 120
4.5 The Ratifiers: Median Voters and Political Parties 125
4.6 Summary 127

Chapter Five: Why (Unpopular) Leaders Announce Popular Votes
By Thomas König and Daniel Finke 129
5.1 Political Leaders and Their Announcements of Referendums 132
5.2 Ratification Hurdles in Each Country 134
5.3 Decisions along the Ratification Path: A Strategic Consideration 137
5.4 The Empirical Analysis of Referendum Announcements 142
5.5 From Announcing Referendums to a Reflection Period and Reform Crisis 147

Chapter Six: Principals and Agents: From the Convention's Proposal to the Constitutional Treaty
By Thomas König and Daniel Finke 151
6.1 The Setup for Intergovernmental Bargaining 154
6.2 The Reaction to Failure: Delegating the Negotiation Mandate 158
6.3 How Drifting Agents Enabled a Disagreeable Compromise 160
6.4 From Compromising Agents to the Defeat by the Vote of the Irish 166

Chapter Seven: In the Aftermath of the Negative Referendums: The Irish Resistance
By Thomas König and Daniel Finke 170
7.1 The Strategy of the German Presidency 173
7.2 Moderate but Well-directed Concessions 177
7.3 From Treaty Reform to Constitution Building, and Back 184
Conclusion 188

Appendix: Research Design and Methodology
By Thomas König and Sven-Oliver Proksch 199

References 209

Index 221