Current Controversies in Virtue Theory

Virtue is among the most venerable concepts in philosophy, and has recently seen a major revival. However, new challenges to conceptions of virtue have also arisen. In Current Controversies in Virtue Theory, five pairs of cutting-edge philosophers square off over central topics in virtue theory: the nature of virtue, the connection between virtue and flourishing, the connection between moral and epistemic virtues, the way in which virtues are acquired, and the possibility of attaining virtue. Mark Alfano guides his readers through these essays (all published here for the first time), with a synthetic introduction, succinct abstracts of each debate, suggested further readings and study questions for each controversy, and a list of further controversies to be explored.

Autorentext

Mark Alfano is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oregon. He specializes in moral psychology broadly construed, including virtue theory, decision making, ethics, and experimental philosophy. His first book was Character as Moral Fiction (2013). He has also participated in a number of interdisciplinary projects, including a quarter-million-dollar investigation of the nature, causes of, and consequences of intellectual humility.

Inhalt

Acknowledgements Introduction What is a virtue? A pluralist theory of virtue Against radical pluralism Study questions Does virtue contribute to flourishing? How virtue contributes to flourishing Virtue and oppression Study questions How are ethical and epistemic virtues related? Virtue epistemology: Character versus competence Character virtues, epistemic agency, and reflective knowledge Study questions How are virtues acquired? From personality to character to virtue Russell on acquiring virtue Study questions Can people be virtuous? Ramsifying virtue theory Ramsify (by all means)-but do not 'dumb down' the moral virtues Study questions A brief introduction to other virtue theoretic controversies Why attribute virtues and vices to other people and ourselves? What can feminist ethics contribute to virtue theory? Should virtue theory be pursued naturalistically? References